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Introduction

IN ITS RECENT DECISION in Bond v. United States, the Supreme

Court explained that because the Tenth Amendment “secures the
freedom of the individual,” private parties who otherwise satisfy Article III’s standing requirements and other prudential requirements
may challenge federal laws as violating the Tenth Amendment.1 In so
doing, the Court reversed the majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue and removed a significant categorical bar to individual Tenth Amendment challenges. This Article explains Bond’s
holding and explores its implications for future Tenth Amendment
challenges by private parties.
Although Bond contains some expansive language regarding the
role of Tenth Amendment in protecting individual liberties, it should
not be read too broadly. Bond clarified that the Tenth Amendment
protects individual liberties and thus prudential, third-party standing
principles do not prevent individuals from bringing a Tenth Amendment challenge against federal statutes that impair their liberties.2 But
Bond also made clear that individual Tenth Amendment challenges
must satisfy traditional Article III standing requirements and that not
every violation of the Tenth Amendment automatically entails an impairment of individual liberty that supports standing.3 As a result, Article III standing requirements will hinder many individual Tenth
Amendment challenges, and many individual challenges will not succeed without the support of states. Thus, despite the breadth of the
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Court’s language in Bond, states may significantly influence whether
private parties can successfully assert the states’ sovereign interests in a
Tenth Amendment challenge.
Litigants must understand these limitations as they attempt to use
Bond to challenge federal statutes that, until this point, have been protected from individual suits by the bar that most courts of appeals
have imposed on private-party Tenth Amendment standing. Put succinctly, while Bond rightly removed the prudential bar to individual
Tenth Amendment challenges, it did not confer Article III standing to
each and every litigant alleging a Tenth Amendment injury. Litigants
will still need to separately satisfy the Article III requirements, blunting the impact of Bond and likely insulating many federal statutes
from individual Tenth Amendment challenges.
This Article explores these issues in five Parts. Part I provides a
brief outline of standing doctrine. Part II examines the circuit court
split on Tenth Amendment standing and outlines the Bond decision
and its resolution of the circuit split. Part III analyzes Bond’s practical
implications for Tenth Amendment litigation and explains how Article III standing requirements will continue to pose a significant problem for certain Tenth Amendment claims. Part IV applies this insight
to current litigation, focusing in particular on the standing issues implicated in one of the most common targets of Tenth Amendment
challenges, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”). Part V concludes with some suggestions for courts and
litigants considering individual Tenth Amendment challenges.

I.

Overview of Standing Principles

Standing principles are rooted in Article III’s limitation of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and in historical conceptions of the
proper role of the courts.4 Standing rules generally focus on whether
the case before the court is the type of action that a court should
4. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011). Scholars have disputed the standing doctrine’s historical pedigree. Compare Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
166 (1992) (“It is now apparently the law that Article III forbids Congress from granting
standing to ‘citizens’ to bring suit. But this view . . . is surprisingly novel. It has no support
in the text or history of Article III. It is essentially an invention of federal judges, and
recent ones at that.”), with Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (“[H]istory does not defeat standing doctrine;
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning.”).
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decide.5 Most standing rules stem from two basic concerns. First, a
concern that the circumstances of the dispute—i.e., the lack of “concrete adverseness” between the parties, or a party seeking to assert the
rights of a third party not before the court—would hinder effective
litigation of the case and may lead to mistaken decisions.6 Second, a
concern that adjudicating the type of dispute presented—i.e., a generalized grievance or citizen suit—would offend separation of powers
principles by unnecessarily involving the judiciary in disputes about
the wisdom or propriety of executive and legislative action.7
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has recognized two
different types of standing requirements, both of which must be satisfied before a federal court may reach the merits of a claim: those limiting federal court jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies” pursuant
to Article III, and those limiting federal jurisdiction based on prudential, judicially fashioned factors.8
A. Article III Standing
The Supreme Court has distilled Article III’s case or controversy
limitation into three requirements: a party must show that it (1) has
suffered or will imminently suffer a concrete and particular injury, (2)
that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) would be
redressed by a favorable decision.9 The first standing requirement—
concrete injury—focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper person
to bring suit and gives effect to the general principle that only those
who are adversely affected by unlawful conduct may challenge it.10
Injuries that are sufficiently concrete to support Article III standing
include harm to “‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well
5. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decided the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.”).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining that the “gist” of standing is
the concern that litigants possess “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions
. . . .”).
7. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 57, 58 (5th ed. 2007).
8. See id. at 60 (indicating that the Supreme Court has announced constitutional
requirements, which are those derived from the Court’s interpretation of Article III, and
prudential standing requirements, which are not based in the Constitution but on prudent
judicial administration).
9. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (delineating the three
constitutional standing requirements pursuant to Article III’s case or controversy
limitation).
10. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 62.
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as economic values.”11 Invasion of interests traditionally protected at
common law also generally constitutes a cognizable injury for standing purposes.12 However, a citizen’s general interest in seeing the laws
upheld or having Congress or the executive branch act in conformity
with the Constitution or federal statutes is usually too abstract to give
rise to a cognizable injury.13 Similarly, a taxpayer generally does not
have a cognizable interest in seeing her tax dollars spent in a manner
consistent with the federal Constitution and statutes.14
The second and third requirements—traceability and redressability—focus on whether the defendant is a proper person to be
sued. Traceability requires a showing that the defendant caused the
plaintiff’s injury.15 Redressability requires that relief against the defen-

11. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (quoting
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.
1965)). Although Camp concerned standing under the Administrative Procedure Act
rather than under Article III of the Constitution, the Court has adopted the same standards for Article III standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 218 (1974) (“[In Camp] the Court . . . in the context of judicial review of regulatory
agency action held that whatever else the ‘case or controversy’ requirement embodied, its
essence is [the Article III] requirement of ‘injury in fact.’”).
12. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 69.
13. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221–22 (holding that reservists lacked standing as citizens
to challenge congressmen serving in army reserves in violation of Incompatibility Clause,
U.S. CONST. art I, § 6); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam) (rejecting
challenge to appointment of Justice Black under the Ineligibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 6, because petitioner failed to “show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the public”).
14. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343 (2006) (“On several occasions, this Court has denied federal taxpayers standing under Article III to object to a particular expenditure of federal funds simply because they are taxpayers.”); Schlesinger, 418 U.S.
at 221 (“[T]he District Court . . . denied respondents’ standing as taxpayers for failure to
satisfy the nexus test. We agree with that conclusion since respondents did not challenge
an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting
Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status.”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer’s
action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate
what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: ‘The
party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally.’” (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))).
15. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (explaining that the standing inquiry
seeks to answer three questions, including whether “the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury [is] too attenuated”).
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dant remedy the plaintiff’s asserted injury.16 Where the defendant
played no role in the plaintiff’s injury or relief against the defendant
would not remedy the plaintiff’s injury, resolution of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant will often have no immediate
practical consequences and thus the dispute is in a sense abstract and
hypothetical. Traceability and redressability problems arise where the
connection between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s conduct
is indirect or attenuated, often because a third party who is not a defendant in the action interrupts the connection between the challenged conduct and the concrete injury.17 The concern is that even if
relief is granted against the defendant, the nondefendant third party
may continue to harm the plaintiff, thus rendering relief against the
defendant pointless. For example, in Allen v. Wright, parents of African
American school children brought suit against the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”), arguing that its failure to enforce a prohibition on tax
exemptions for racially segregated charter schools harmed their children’s educational prospects.18 The Court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because the connection between their injury and the
IRS’s lack of enforcement of tax exemption limits was too indirect and
attenuated.19 In particular, the Court was concerned that the racially
segregated charter schools, whose conduct most directly caused the
plaintiffs’ injury, might persist in their racially restrictive policies, even
if they were to lose their tax exemption.20
In sum, to satisfy the Article III standing requirements, plaintiffs
must demonstrate that they have suffered a concrete injury that can
be directly remedied by a decision in their favor.
B. Prudential Standing
In addition to Article III standing requirements, the Supreme
Court has also recognized a limited number of prudential standing
principles. Prudential standing refers to a cluster of doctrines that are
not mandated by Article III, but rest on principles of judicial self-governance “closely related to Art[icle] III concerns.”21 Because pruden16. See id. (explaining that the standing inquiry seeks to answer three questions, including whether “the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable
ruling [is] too speculative . . . .”).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 18–20.
18. Id. at 739–40.
19. Id. at 757.
20. Id. at 758.
21. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)).
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tial standing rules are not required by the Constitution, Congress can
override them and empower the federal courts to hear cases that, as a
prudential matter, they would ordinarily decline to adjudicate.22
These principles include two related rules: “‘[T]he general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, [and] the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches.’”23
Bond implicated the first prudential standing rule, “that a party
‘generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’”24 Assertion of another party’s rights is also referred to as “thirdparty standing” or “jus tertii,”25 and the Supreme Court has given two
reasons for refusing to adjudicate such claims:
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily,
and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not
wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of
whether the in-court litigant is successful or not. Second, third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own
rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore
should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective
advocates of those rights are before them. The holders of the rights
may have a like preference, to the extent they will be bound by the
courts’ decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis.26

But these principles do not apply in all cases with the same force.
Indeed, the courts have recognized exceptions to the rule against
third-party standing where (1) a litigant will be an effective proponent
of the third party’s rights and has interests aligned with the third
party, and (2) the third party is unlikely or unable to assert her
rights.27
22. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
23. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
24. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363 (2011) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at
499).
25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 84.
26. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976) (citations omitted).
27. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413–15 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant can object to race-based exclusions of jurors regardless of whether the defendant and
the excluded juror are the same race); see also Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 623–24 n.3 (1989) (stating that an exception to the rule against thirdparty standing applies based on “three factors: the relationship of the litigant to the person
whose rights are being asserted; the ability of the person to advance his own rights; and the
impact of the litigation on third-party interests.”).
The Court has invoked these exceptions in a wide variety of cases. See Powers, 499 U.S.
at 410 (“[A] criminal defendant has standing to raise the equal protection rights of a juror
excluded from service . . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990)
(finding that an attorney has standing to raise due process rights of potential clients af-
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The second prudential principle bars adjudication of generalized
grievances. The Supreme Court has explained that a party has no
standing “when the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared
in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.”28
Courts have used this limitation to prevent suits by parties seeking to
challenge laws as contravening the structural requirements of the
Constitution where the “only injury is as a citizen or a taxpayer concerned with having the government follow the law.”29
C. Results-Oriented Application of Standing Principles
Notwithstanding the well-established Article III and prudential
standing requirements outlined above, the Supreme Court’s application of these principles to individual cases has often been criticized as
uneven or results-oriented.30 According to these criticisms, instead of
adhering to previously proclaimed standing precepts, the Court has
altered these principles or crafted narrow exceptions to achieve desired results.31 Whatever the merits of these criticisms, the Court has,
at times, been sensitive to the ways in which standing doctrine interacts with the substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The
Court has refined the standing requirements applicable to certain
types of constitutional claims to facilitate individuals’ assertions of
constitutional rights that the Court considers important. Flast v. Cohen
fected by a provision of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 that limited voluntary fee
arrangements between attorneys and black lung claimants); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered,
491 U.S. at 623 n.3 (recognizing that an attorney may assert a client’s Sixth Amendment
right to a counsel of his choice); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682–84
(1977) (holding that sellers of mail-order contraceptives have standing to assert the rights
of potential customers); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–97 (1976) (holding that sellers
of beer have standing to assert equal protection rights of young male customers); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443–46 (1972) (finding that distributors of contraceptives have
standing to assert the rights of potential unmarried customers); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 254–57 (1953) (holding that white sellers of land have standing to assert the
equal protection rights of potential black purchasers). But cf. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
125, 134–35 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the breadth of third-party standing
exceptions and suggesting that cases recognizing such exceptions “have gone far astray”).
28. Warth, 422 U.S. at 490.
29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 91.
30. See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1422–25
(1995) (surveying criticisms of the Supreme Court’s application of Article III and prudential standing requirements to individual cases).
31. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1786
(1999) (“Modern standing law is closer to a part of the political system than to a part of the
legal system. It is characterized by numerous malleable doctrines and numerous inconsistent precedents. Judges regularly manipulate the doctrines and rely on selective citation of
precedents to further their own political preferences.”).
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provides a well-known example.32 As a general rule, a federal taxpayer
lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Congress’ expenditure of his tax dollars.33 But despite this general rule, the Court held
in Flast that the Establishment Clause creates or recognizes a concrete
interest in refusing to contribute even “three pence” to the establishment of religion.34 Thus, where Congress exercises its Spending
Clause power to improperly establish religion, federal taxpayers who
object to such expenditures suffer a concrete injury and have standing
to challenge the expenditure.35 By expanding the concept of Article
III injury to include a harm that is not obviously concrete, the Court
ensured that federal expenditures would remain subject to Establishment Clause scrutiny.36
The Supreme Court has similarly refined the concept of Article
III injury applicable to claims of discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. In equal protection challenges to discriminatory policies governing school admissions or the award of contracts,
the plaintiff may have problems showing that, absent the challenged
policy, the school would have admitted the applicant or awarded the
contract to the plaintiff. For example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the plaintiff challenged the University of California at
Davis’ use of affirmative action in determining whether to admit students to its medical school.37 Given the large number of applicants,
32. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
33. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344–45 (2006).
34. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1901)). Standing to enforce the Establishment Clause’s limit on Congress’ taxing and
spending power conferred by Article I, Section 8, is necessary to address the concern that
“religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and
spending powers to aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general.” Id. at
103–04; see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011)
(characterizing the injury recognized in Flast as one where “[a] dissenter whose tax dollars
are ‘extracted and spent’” is “in some small measure . . . made to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience.” (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106)); Cuno, 547 U.S. at
347 (characterizing Flast as recognizing “the right not to ‘contribute three pence . . . for
the support of any one [religious] establishment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Flast,
392 U.S. at 103)).
35. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06.
36. See id. (“[T]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically
limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8 . . . . Consequently, we hold
that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power
when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing
and spending power.”).
37. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1978).
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the small number of students accepted (only 100), and the complexity
of admissions decisions,38 Bakke would probably have failed to show
that the school would have admitted him to the medical school, absent the University’s affirmative action policy. The Court nevertheless
agreed with the trial court that Bakke had standing because he had
suffered “an injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the University’s decision not to permit [him] to compete for all 100 places in the
class, simply because of his race.”39 By broadly characterizing the
equal protection injury as a denial of equal opportunity, rather than
denial of the specific benefit sought, the Court has facilitated equal
protection challenges to discriminatory policies whose effects on any
particular plaintiff are uncertain.40
A final example of modified standing requirements to facilitate
individuals’ assertions of constitutional rights is the overbreadth doctrine applied by the Supreme Court to facial First Amendment challenges to restrictions on speech.41 As noted above, prudential
standing principles ordinarily preclude a party from asserting the
rights of a third party not before the Court.42 However, the Supreme
Court has consistently permitted an individual to bring a facial First
Amendment challenge to a law or regulation limiting speech, even if
that law or regulation could constitutionally apply to him.43 In such a
38. Id. at 273–74, 273 n.2.
39. Id. at 281.
40. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719
(2007) (“[O]ne form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff . . . .”); Ne. Fla. Chapter of the
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)
(“When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one
group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, . . . [t]he ‘injury in fact’
. . . is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier[,] . . . not
the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”). For analysis and criticism of this doctrine see
generally Spann, supra note 30 (discussing the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine in affirmative action cases).
41. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484 (1989) (“The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth was designed as a ‘departure from traditional rules of standing’ . . . .”
(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))).
42. See supra Part I.B.
43. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (explaining that the “expansive” overbreadth remedy is provided “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an
overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech . . . .”); Sec’y of State v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955–58 (1984) (holding that a professional fundraising organization had standing to challenge a statute that prohibited charitable organizations form paying expenses in excess of 25% of the funds collected in fundraising activities
because “[f]acial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society to prevent the statute from chilling the First
Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.”); cf. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
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case, a plaintiff is essentially asserting the First Amendment rights of
others to whom the challenged law cannot constitutionally be applied.
Thus, this exception to the traditional third-party standing rule exists
to facilitate First Amendment challenges to restriction on speech.

II.

The Circuit Split and its Resolution in Bond

Prior to Bond, the vast majority of circuits had concluded that private parties lacked standing to challenge federal laws as violating the
Tenth Amendment.44 Almost uniformly, they did so without considering whether this conclusion was consistent with the logic and purpose
of the amendment, relying instead on language from a seven-decade
old Supreme Court case, Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.45 Even more troubling for standing jurisprudence, several
circuits appeared confused as to whether the bar to private-party
Tenth Amendment standing stems from either Article III or from prudential standing principles. Here, we outline these circuit cases, their
inconsistencies, and the corrective measures of Bond.
A. The Circuit Split
United States v. Parker46 was one of the first cases to consider an
individual’s standing to assert a Tenth Amendment violation. In
Parker, the defendant was convicted of possessing a loaded firearm in a
vehicle or on a public street under the Assimilative Crimes Act, a statute that enabled the federal government to prosecute crimes committed in violation of state criminal law if the crime occurred on federal
lands.47 In considering the defendant’s standing to raise this defense,
the Tenth Circuit made two analytical choices that the majority of circuits followed thereafter. First, without analyzing whether the Tenth
Amendment actually protected individual rights, the court simply
cited to Tennessee Electric as holding that individuals lack standing to
bring Tenth Amendment challenges.48 In Tennessee Electric, the Supreme Court addressed whether Congress contravened the Tenth
Amendment by creating a corporation, the Tennessee Valley AuthorU.S. 641, 650–52 (1984) (finding no evidence that a statute challenged by Time was overbroad, but asserting that “an overbreadth challenge can be raised on behalf of others . . .
when the statute is substantially overbroad, i.e., when the statute is unconstitutional in a
substantial portion of the cases to which it applies.”).
44. See infra Part II.A.
45. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
46. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 1281.
48. Id. at 1285.
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ity (“TVA”), which had the authority to develop a series of dams along
the Tennessee River.49 A group of state-chartered power companies
that were injured by TVA’s competition initiated the lawsuit.50 The
Court first held, on the merits, that federal competition in the market
was not regulation, and therefore Congress had not violated the
Tenth Amendment by granting TVA authority to build dams.51 The
Court then observed: “As we have seen there is no objection to the
Authority’s operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to
raise any question under the amendment.”52 This seventy year-old sentence from Tennessee Electric was the fraying tightrope upon which the
circuits denying private-party standing would come to rely.
Second, the Tenth Circuit characterized the purported limitation
on private-party Tenth Amendment standing as deriving from Article
III, rather than prudential grounds.53 The court sua sponte raised this
issue, explaining that it was required “to ensure that there is an Article
III case or controversy before [it]” and ultimately concluding that “the
case presented no justiciable case or controversy.”54 This characterization is perplexing because the court went on to evaluate the merits of
Parker’s Second Amendment challenge to the Assimilative Crimes
Act, presumably because he possessed a constitutionally sufficient injury to challenge his conviction.55 In other words, absent Article III
standing, there would be no need to evaluate the merits of the Second
Amendment challenge. Several other circuits repeated these two analytical missteps, demonstrating the confusion among lower courts regarding the difference between prudential and constitutional
standing requirements.
In Medeiros v. Vincent, the First Circuit analyzed a challenge to a
Rhode Island state environmental regulation that restricted the number of lobsters that could be harvested via methods other than a
trap.56 The state regulation was implemented pursuant to a federal
statute that arguably compelled state compliance.57 Medeiros, who
had violated the state regulation, challenged it as an unlawful com49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Tenn. Elec. Power, 306 U.S. at 134.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 144.
Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284–85.
Id. (quoting Rector v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 1282.
431 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 33.
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mandeering of Rhode Island’s legislative prerogatives under the
Tenth Amendment.58 Following the Tenth Circuit’s lead in Parker, the
First Circuit relied on Tennessee Electric to hold that Medeiros lacked
standing to challenge the law.59 Although not entirely clear, the First
Circuit appears to have viewed the private-party Tenth Amendment
standing bar as a prudential limitation for two reasons. First, it considered Medeiros’ equal protection and substantive due process challenges, thereby suggesting that Medeiros possessed a cognizable injury
sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements.60 Moreover, the
court justified the limitation on Medeiros’ standing with reference to
the prudential concern that allowing private parties to challenge laws
for violating rights they lack would result in a “substantial increase in
such litigation before the federal courts.”61 Medeiros thus improved the
analysis of Parker by accurately depicting the Tenth Amendment
standing bar as based on prudential, third-party standing concerns,
rather than Article III requirements.
The Second Circuit also addressed the issue of individual Tenth
Amendment standing in Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. v. Legal Services
Corp.62 In Brooklyn Legal Services Corp., local legal assistance providers
who receive federal funding through the Legal Services Corporation
(“LSC”) challenged the constitutionality of federal restrictions on
such providers.63 The court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had
constitutionally sufficient Article III injuries and concluded that they
did.64 However, the court refused to reach the merits of the Tenth
Amendment challenge and, based on Tennessee Electric, held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.65 In tension with its initial ruling that Article III was satisfied, the Court concluded that Tennessee Electric’s treatment of the Tenth Amendment was dicta, stating that “[w]here the
standing question concerns the constitutional jurisdiction of a federal
court, however, the judgment on the jurisdictional issue predominates
and is antecedent to any discussion of the merits.”66 Thus, it is somewhat unclear whether Brooklyn Legal Services viewed the standing bar as
58. Id.
59. Id. at 35–36.
60. As discussed, consideration of the merits of other constitutional challenges did
not prevent the Tenth Circuit in Parker from characterizing the Tenth Amendment limitation as constitutional.
61. Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 36.
62. 462 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
63. Id. at 221.
64. Id. at 225–28.
65. Id. at 236.
66. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
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prudential or constitutional, but, in any event, it followed both Parker
and Medeiros in concluding that Tennessee Electric did provide such a
bar.
Finally, in United States v. Bond, which would eventually work its
way to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit sua sponte raised the issue
of whether the defendant Carol Ann Bond had standing to raise a
Tenth Amendment challenge to the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998,67 which criminalizes owning or using
certain toxic chemicals.68 Bond argued that section 229(a)(1) of the
Act criminalized purely local behavior, infringing on police powers
traditionally and routinely reserved for the states under the Tenth
Amendment.69 Bond, a trained microbiologist, had been convicted
and incarcerated under section 229(a)(1) after she spread chemicals
on her best friend’s property.70 Bond sought revenge upon discovering that her best friend was pregnant and that Bond’s husband was
the father of the child.71 The Third Circuit held, primarily based on
Tennessee Electric, that Bond lacked “standing to claim that the federal
Government is impinging on state sovereignty in violation of the
Tenth Amendment, absent the involvement of a state or its officers as
a party or parties.”72 Apparently, the court treated the Tenth Amendment bar on private-party standing as a prudential limitation.73 The
court also addressed the merits of Bond’s additional constitutional
challenge, her vagueness claim,74 suggesting that it did not believe she
lacked Article III standing.
In contrast to the above cases, a limited number of circuit courts
looked past Tennessee Electric and held that individuals could bring actions asserting Tenth Amendment injuries. However, even these cases
create some confusion regarding the nature of the supposed Tenth
Amendment standing limitation—that is, whether it is prudential or
constitutional—and the nature of the Tenth Amendment right itself.
For example, in Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, the Seventh Circuit
held that a former Indianapolis police officer possessed standing to
67. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2006).
68. 581 F.3d 128, 135–38 (3d Cir. 2009).
69. Id. at 134.
70. Id. at 131–33.
71. Id. at 131.
72. Id. at 137.
73. See id. (noting that other circuit courts “point to varying prudential considerations
to support their determinations,” and citing United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 527 (8th
Cir. 2009), for the proposition that “the holding of Tennessee Electric comports with prudential standing principles that generally limit a plaintiff to asserting his own rights.”).
74. Id. at 138–39.
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challenge the Gun Control Act of 1968.75 The plaintiff lost his job
pursuant to this law, which prohibits persons convicted of domestic
violence offenses from carrying firearms.76 Gillespie alleged that the
federal law “strips the States of their right to establish the qualifications for [law enforcement] officers . . . [and compelled] state officers
to implement a federal statute . . . in violation of the Tenth Amendment.”77 The court held that Gillespie possessed standing because he
suffered an injury traceable to an alleged violation of the Tenth
Amendment, which protects individual rights.78 In fact, the Seventh
Circuit even entertained Gillespie’s commandeering challenge—one
of the few courts to reach the merits of such a challenge—but ultimately rejected it on the merits.79
Similarly, in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v U.S. Department of Energy, the
Eleventh Circuit found that a private party had standing to challenge
section 402 of the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.80
The law purported to conserve natural gas for industrial uses for
which alternative fuels were not available.81 The Act achieved that
goal by prohibiting local gas distribution companies from providing
natural gas for certain non-industrial purposes.82 Atlanta Gas Light
Company brought suit challenging this restriction.83 The court held
that the company satisfied the Article III injury requirement and that
the Tenth Amendment posed no bar.84 Rather than considering
whether the Tenth Amendment claim was subject to the prudential
third-party standing bar, the court considered whether the claim satisfied the nexus requirement for taxpayer standing.85 This approach
further complicated the jurisprudence on the purported Tenth
Amendment limitation, because no other circuit viewed the limitation
through this lens. The court reasoned that the nexus requirement was
not implicated because this was not a taxpayer suit, and therefore “the
petitioners may make constitutional objections based on any of its provisions so long as they show the requisite injury in fact and its causal
75. 185 F.3d 693, 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1999).
76. Id. at 697.
77. Id. at 700.
78. Id. at 703.
79. Id. at 708.
80. 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 & n.16 (11th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 1362.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1363–64.
84. Id. at 1363 n.7, 1368 n.16.
85. Id. at 1368 n.16. For a discussion of the limitations on taxpayer standing, see supra
Parts I.A–B.
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relation to the action in question.”86 The court ultimately rejected the
Tenth Amendment challenge on the merits reasoning that the states
had the ability to refuse to implement the Act, and therefore the statute did not violate the Tenth Amendment.87
With this jurisprudential backdrop, the Supreme Court entered
the fray and addressed whether the Tenth Amendment posed a barrier to private-party standing.
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Bond
In Bond, the Supreme Court resolved the troubled areas in the
circuit split. In Justice Kennedy’s decision, the Court unanimously
held that (1) the Article III injury requirement was satisfied by Bond’s
incarceration; and that (2) because the Tenth Amendment protects
individual liberties as well as states’ rights, it posed no prudential barrier to individual parties challenging federal laws as violating the
Amendment.88
In addressing the circuit split, the Court clarified that Article III
was not a barrier to Bond’s suit.89 The Court reasoned that because
Bond was a criminal defendant challenging her conviction and sentence, the case or controversy requirement of Article III was readily
satisfied: Bond’s injury was the incarceration following her conviction,
and the injury was redressable by invalidation of the federal statute
authorizing the conviction.90 Thus, before engaging whether the
Tenth Amendment conferred individual rights, the Court held that
Article III was satisfied.
Bond is important because it reiterates that criminal defendants
possess Article III standing to challenge the validity of the laws they
are convicted of violating. But beyond that, the Court clarified the
application of third-party standing rules to Tenth Amendment claims.
As outlined above, most circuits that had considered the matter had
held that the Tenth Amendment protected the sovereign rights of
86. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16.
87. Id. at 1369.
88. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366–67 (2011).
89. Id. at 2361–62.
90. Id. at 2362 (“Bond’s challenge to her conviction and sentence ‘satisfies the caseor-controversy requirement, because the incarceration . . . constitutes a concrete injury,
caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction.’” (quoting
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998))); see also id. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(“Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.”).
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states, not individual rights.91 In Bond, the Court-appointed amicus to
defend the judgment argued that Bond was essentially seeking to assert the sovereign rights of the states protected by the Tenth Amendment and that the rule against third-party standing precluded her
from doing so.92 The United States took a similar position, arguing
that Bond had standing to challenge the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act on the ground that it exceeded Congress’
enumerated powers, but not on the ground that it impinged on the
rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment.93
The Court rejected these arguments, stating that they rested on
the flawed premise that the Tenth Amendment protected only states’
rights.94 The Court explained that “[s]tate sovereignty is not just an
end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’”95 The Court added:
“By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the
concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”96 Accordingly, “[a]n individual has a direct
interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement
of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and
redressable.”97 The Court also relied on an analogy to its separation of
powers cases, pointing out that in INS v. Chadha and numerous other
cases, individuals were permitted to challenge the constitutionality of
laws violating separation-of-power principles.98 The Court reasoned:
“Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke
separation-of-powers or checks-and-balances constraints, so too may a
litigant, in a proper case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention
of constitutional principles of federalism.”99
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. Brief for the Amicus Curiae Appointed to Defend Judgment Below at 21–26,
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 09-1227). After certiorari was granted in
Bond, the United States abandoned its position that Bond lacked standing, and the Supreme Court appointed Stephen R. McAllister as amicus curiae to defend the judgment
below. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361. However, the United States continued to argue that Bond
or any other private litigant would lack standing to make an interference with sovereignty
argument. Id. at 2365–66.
93. Brief for United States at 12–21, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)
(No. 09-1227).
94. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366.
95. Id. at 2364 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2365 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
99. Id.
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Significantly, the Court did not find that Bond’s case was an exception to the rule against third-party standing, but rather that the
rule does not apply to Tenth Amendment challenges at all because
this Amendment protects both state sovereignty and individual liberty.100 In other words, Bond removed the rule against third-party
standing as an obstacle to individual Tenth Amendment
challenges.101

III.

Implications of Bond

It is tempting to think that Bond’s broad language confers on individuals a personal right to challenge all violations of the Tenth
Amendment.102 If the bar on third-party standing was inapplicable to
Bond’s individual Tenth Amendment challenge, one might naturally
assume that Bond was asserting a personal individual right to request
the federal government to comply with the Tenth Amendment. However, the Court avoided such a broad holding throughout its opinion
and repeatedly emphasized that an individual bringing a Tenth
Amendment challenge must satisfy traditional Article III standing requirements.103 In practice, this emphasis will limit the effect of Bond’s
holding as many individual Tenth Amendment claimants will continue to have difficulty meeting Article III standing requirements.
A. Standing Requirements in Tenth Amendment Challenges
The importance of Article III standing in Bond is easy to overlook
because the issue was not disputed, and the Court quickly dismissed
100. Id. at 2366–67.
101. Compare David M. Palmer, Note, Untangling Tenth Amendment Standing: Why Private
Parties Cannot Enforce the Federal Structure, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169 (2008) (arguing
that only states may use the Tenth Amendment to enforce a constitutional check on federal government’s power and private parties lack standing to bring this type of constitutional claims), with Ara B. Gershengorn, Note, Private Party Standing to Raise Tenth
Amendment Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (2000) (arguing that private
parties should have Tenth Amendment standing to challenge the constitutionality of commandeering federal legislation, even if the state fails to raise the claim).
102. A commentator has espoused his belief that Bond broadly alters the landscape of
Tenth Amendment litigation and represents “game on!” for Tenth Amendment challenges, including challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. John C.
Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 185,
185–86.
103. E.g., Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366 (“An individual who challenges federal action on
these grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III requirements, as well as prudential
rules, applicable to all litigants and claims.”).
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any suggestion that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.104 The
Court reasoned that a federal criminal prosecution is obviously a
“case” or “controversy” within the meaning of Article III because Bond
faced a concrete injury—imprisonment—this injury flowed directly
from the allegedly unconstitutional statute that criminalized her conduct; and the invalidation of the challenged statute remedied the injury.105 Because the standing question in Bond was straightforward, the
Court did not need to consider what types of injuries would be sufficiently concrete and adequately connected to federal action to confer
standing on a plaintiff bringing a Tenth Amendment challenge. However, the reasoning of Bond suggests some insights that will be relevant
in future Tenth Amendment litigation.
Bond makes clear that these traditional Article III standing requirements and prudential standing rules will be applied to Tenth
Amendment challenges:
An individual who challenges federal action on [Tenth
Amendment] grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III requirements, as well as prudential rules, applicable to all litigants
and claims. Individuals have “no standing to complain simply that
their Government is violating the law.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
755 (1984). It is not enough that a litigant “suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.” Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). If,
in connection with the claim being asserted, a litigant who commences suit fails to show actual or imminent harm that is concrete
and particular, fairly traceable to the conduct complained of, and
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, the Federal Judiciary
cannot hear the claim. Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560–561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
These requirements must be satisfied before an individual may assert a constitutional claim; and in some instances, the result may be
104. Id. at 2361 (“In the instant case, moreover, it is apparent—and in fact conceded
not only by the Government but also by amicus—that Article III poses no barrier.”).
105. Id. at 2361–62; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616–17 (1989) (applying appellate standing principles); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986)
(same); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show
That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239
(1999) (discussing standing of United States to bring criminal prosecutions).
Arguably, Bond also had standing to bring her appeal because she remained in prison
as a result of the challenged statute—a concrete injury that would be remedied by a
favorable exercise of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361 (“One
who seeks to initiate or continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate, among
other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief requested, and, in addition, an
‘ongoing interest in the dispute’ on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient to
establish ‘concrete adverseness.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.
Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011)).
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that a State is the only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite injury.106

As noted above in Part I.C, the Court has refined Article III and
prudential standing requirements to facilitate certain types of constitutional challenges that might otherwise fail for lack of standing. But
it is unlikely that the Court will similarly modify Article III standing
requirements to facilitate Tenth Amendment claims for two reasons.
First, the Court specifically reaffirmed the application of traditional
standing principles to Tenth Amendment claims. The Court’s citation
to Allen, Frothingham, and Lujan is significant, as in each case the Court
rejected efforts to broaden standing requirements and reaffirmed
standing limitations.107 Second, the Court’s characterization of the individual interest protected by the Tenth Amendment fits neatly within
the traditional standing framework. As the Court explained, federalism, like other separation of powers principles, protects individual liberty by limiting government power.108 Thus, where a federal
regulation transgresses the federalism principles enshrined in the
Tenth Amendment and, by doing so, also imposes concrete limits on
individual liberty, those individuals whose liberty is impaired have
standing to challenge that transgression.109
In sum, Bond did not hold that every Tenth Amendment violation
ipso facto infringes individual liberty. Rather, an individual seeking to
challenge such a violation must show that the challenged government
106. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366 (parallel citations omitted).
107. The Court’s citation of Frothingham is particularly significant because there the
Court relied on the rule against taxpayer standing to reject a Tenth Amendment claim.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–488 (1923) (decided with Frothingham v. Mellon); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007) (“In Frothingham, a federal taxpayer sought to challenge federal appropriations for mothers’ and
children’s health, arguing that federal involvement in this area intruded on the rights reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment and would ‘increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take [the plaintiff’s] property without due process of law.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486)). The Court has also emphasized
that the Flast exception to the rule against taxpayer standing articulated in Frothingham is a
narrow one and has steadfastly refused to expand it. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011) (declining to extend Flast to permit Establishment
Clause challenge to state tax credits); Hein, 551 U.S. at 603–05 (declining to extend Flast to
permit Establishment Clause challenge to spending decision by Executive not mandated by
congressional appropriation); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49
(2006) (declining to extend Flast to permit Commerce Clause challenges by taxpayers);
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 478–80 (1982) (declining to declining to extend Flast to permit Establishment
Clause challenge to statute enacted under Property Clause).
108. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364–65.
109. See id. at 2364.
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action has actually impinged on his liberty by causing some concrete
injury. As the Court put it: “An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws
causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable.”110 As the
Court recognized, this means that in some cases, no individual will
have standing to assert a violation of the Tenth Amendment.111 Thus,
even after Bond, an individual may not go about challenging federal
statutes or regulations simply because they violate Tenth Amendment
or federalism principles—she must show that challenged statutes
cause her a concrete injury that would be redressed by the relief she
seeks.112
B. Individual Commandeering Claims After Bond
One important source of potential Tenth Amendment challenges
is the anti-commandeering doctrine. This doctrine prohibits the federal government from using the states’ sovereign authority to implement federal law.113 The Supreme Court has elaborated this doctrine
in a trio of cases. First, in New York v. United States, the Court invalidated a federal statute controlling states’ disposal of radioactive waste
that “offer[ed] state governments a ‘choice’ of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of Congress.”114 The choice was unacceptable because either option violated
the principle that “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.’”115
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2366.
112. The limited number of cases decided since Bond have buttressed this conclusion.
See LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A] litigant is in no way freed
from familiar constitutional and prudential standing requirements merely because he challenges a law that he claims [violates the Tenth Amendment].”); Purpura v. Sebelius, 446
Fed. App’x 496, 498 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying uninjured plaintiffs’ challenge to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act because “Bond did nothing to upend the well-established standing rules.”).
113. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
114. Id. at 175. The Court upheld two other portions of the statute that encourage
states to participate in interstate compacts for the regulation of radioactive waste by authorizing States where radioactive waste is disposed (1) to impose a surcharge on waste received from other States, and (2) to gradually increase the cost of access to disposal sites
and even deny access altogether. Id. at 171–74.
115. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
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The Court further elaborated on this principle in Printz v. United
States, in which it invalidated a transitional provision in the Brady Act
requiring state law enforcement officers to perform background
checks on individuals seeking to purchase a handgun under certain
circumstances.116 Just as Congress could not commandeer state legislatures to enact legislation implementing a federal regulatory program, neither could it commandeer state executive officials to execute
and enforce federal regulations.117 Finally, in Reno v. Condon, the
Court limited the scope of the anti-commandeering doctrine, upholding a federal statute limiting states’ disclosure of a driver’s personal
information without his consent.118 The Court explained that the statute did not commandeer state officials because it “‘regulate[d] state
activities,’ rather than ‘seek[ing] to control or influence the manner
in which States regulate private parties.’”119 The anti-commandeering
rule does not prevent the federal government from regulating individuals directly or from regulating certain activities of the states, but it
does prohibit the federal government from compelling state executive
and legislative officials to regulate individuals.
1. Third-Party Standing in Commandeering Challenges
Because commandeering implicates a sovereign interest specific
to the state, one might think that, at least in this context, third-party
standing principles would preclude private plaintiffs from asserting a
commandeering claim. But Bond explicitly rejected this theory. The
United States argued before the Court that Bond had standing to “assert[ ] only that Congress could not enact the challenged statute
under its enumerated powers,” but she lacked standing to argue “that
the statute ‘interferes with a specific aspect of state sovereignty.’”120
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the government’s
proposed distinction between interference with sovereignty and limitations on federal power was inapt:
The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are
intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment,
both are expressed by it. Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the National Gov116. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–35 (1997).
117. Id. at 932–33.
118. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150–51 (2000).
119. Id. at 150 (alternation in original) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,
514–15 (1988)).
120. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (quoting Brief for United
States, supra note 93, at 18).
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ernment, and action that exceeds the National Government’s
enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States.
The unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury to persons in individual cases.121

Arguably, this conclusion is dicta because the Court suggested
that Bond’s Tenth Amendment claim was not asserting a theory of
interference with sovereignty.122 Additionally, in a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg suggested a narrower
ground for rejecting the government’s argument in this case, arguing
that an individual has “a personal right not to be convicted under a
constitutionally invalid law,” regardless of the reason for its unconstitutionality.123 But both Justices joined the Court’s unanimous opinion, which rejected the United States’ argument that individuals could
not bring Tenth Amendment claims based on an interference with
state sovereignty and specifically cited New York v. United States—a
commandeering case—to make this point.124 Therefore, even if this
reasoning is dicta, given the unanimous endorsement of all the members of the Supreme Court, it is extremely persuasive dicta.
2. Article III Standing in Tenth Amendment Commandeering
Challenges
Although Bond makes clear that third-party standing doctrine
should pose no obstacle to individual commandeering challengers,
the case is equally clear that individual plaintiffs must satisfy the traditional Article III standing requirements of injury in fact, traceability,
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. See id. The Court stated that “[t]he premise that petitioner does or should avoid
making an ‘interference-with-sovereignty’ argument is flawed,” explaining that Bond’s
principal argument against the statute was that “the conduct with which she is charged is
‘local in nature’ and ‘should be left to local authorities to prosecute’ and that congressional regulation of that conduct ‘signals a massive and unjustifiable expansion of federal
law enforcement into state-regulated domain.’” Id. But it is debatable whether this observation furnishes an alternative basis for the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument,
which might suggest that the language quoted above is dicta. The Court suggested that
even this argument was in some sense an interference with the sovereignty claim because
“[t]he public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign, has been displaced by that of the National Government.” Id. This observation anticipates the Court’s argument, quoted above, that “[t]he principles of limited national
powers and state sovereignty are intertwined.” Id. In other words, when the federal government exceeds its limited power, it trenches on powers reserved to the states, thereby interfering with states’ sovereignty.
123. Id. at 2367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 2367–68 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)); id. at
2359 (syllabus) (noting that Justice Kennedy delivered an unanimous decision of the
Court).
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and redressability.125 As a result, the redressability prong will often
pose a significant standing problem in many commandeering cases,
unless a state joins an individual commandeering challenge. The essence of a commandeering claim is that the federal government has
improperly compelled state legislative or executive officers to regulate
private conduct.126 Where a private individual claims to have suffered
a concrete and particular injury from federal action that violates the
anti-commandeering principle, the injury will usually be indirect: the
federal government has compelled the state to regulate in a manner
that has harmed the plaintiff.127 But federal courts are reluctant to
find standing where an individual’s injury is indirect and “results from
the independent action of some third party not before the court”128—
in an individual anti-commandeering challenge the missing third
party is the State—because the “‘indirectness of the injury . . . may
make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art[icle] III.’”129
As one commentator has pointed out, in most commandeering
cases the difficulty of meeting Article III requirements usually arises at
the redressability stage of the standing inquiry.130 Where state legislation or regulation that was commandeered by a federal statute
harmed a private party, she may have problems showing that, if the
federal statute is invalidated, the improperly compelled state regulatory action would cease.131 This is particularly clear in legislative commandeering cases, where a federal statute compels state legislative
action.132 If states do not challenge the federal statute and instead
enact legislation, it may be difficult for an individual seeking invalida125. See supra Part III.A.
126. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161.
127. See, e.g., Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (considering challenge to Rhode Island statute enacted to comply with the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5108 (1993)); see also infra note 147 and
supporting text (describing requirements on states under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”), Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 590, 590–611
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
128. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)).
129. Id. at 758 (omission in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See Palmer, supra note 101, at 192–94 (explaining the “redressability problem”).
131. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (LexisNexis 2008) (implementing sex offender registration and notification requirements without reference to SORNA or its continuing validity); Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 33 (noting defendants’ argument that state
regulations would remain in place even if the challenged federal statute were invalidated).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 127–29.
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tion of the federal statute to show that, if her claim is successful, the
state legislation that it produced will be repealed. Similarly, where an
individual challenges a federal statute compelling action by state executive officials, proving that the state executive officials would act differently in the absence of the federal statute would be troublesome.
Because the state’s executive officials did not challenge the federal
statute and instead agreed to implement its requirements, whether
they would act differently if the court invalidates the statute is highly
uncertain.133 At a minimum, a state could easily create a nearly insurmountable redressability problem for a private-party’s commandeering challenge simply by intervening in the suit and (credibly)
asserting that it would continue enforcing the challenged state statute
or regulation, even if the challenged federal statute is invalidated.
One student commentator challenged this reasoning, arguing
that the invalidation of a federal statute would redress a plaintiff’s injury because “the plaintiff would receive satisfaction by the removal of
the federal mandate . . . and the opening of the way for him to lobby
his local leaders for reform.”134 But removing one obstacle to a lobbying effort does not mean that it is therefore likely to succeed. Moreover, for a plaintiff to have standing, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to
merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’”135 The Court’s taxpayer standing cases clarify that the
mere possibility of favorable changes in legislation does not suffice to
show redressability.136 The Court has repeatedly rejected taxpayer
133. This point is particularly salient in light of Printz v. United States, which permitted
individual state officials to bring commandeering challenges in their official capacity. 521
U.S. 898, 904 (1997). If an individual plaintiff cannot find a single state official to join his
commandeering challenge, it seems unlikely that state officials will change their policies
even if the commandeering challenge succeeds.
134. Katherine A. Connolly, Note, Who’s Left Standing for State Sovereignty?: Private Party
Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment Claims, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1539, 1580 (2010).
135. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
136. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011) (“Respondents have not established that an injunction against application of the STO tax credit
would prompt Arizona legislators to ‘pass along the supposed increased revenue in the
form of tax reductions.’” (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344
(2006))); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (“[E]stablishing
redressability requires speculating that abolishing the challenged credit will redound to
the benefit of the taxpayer because legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.”); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989)
(“The possibility that taxpayers will receive any direct pecuniary relief from this lawsuit is
‘remote, fluctuating and uncertain,’ . . . and consequently the claimed injury is not ‘likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision.’” (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
487 (1923) and Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
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challenges to state and federal expenditures or tax credits, in part because “establishing redressability requires speculating that abolishing
the challenged credit will redound to the benefit of the taxpayer
[and] legislators will pass along the supposed increased revenue in
the form of tax reductions.”137 Similarly, establishing redressability in
an individual commandeering challenge requires speculating that, absent the challenged federal law, state legislators or executive officials
will repeal the state legislation or regulation that was (voluntarily) enacted pursuant to the challenged federal law.
In some cases, state participation in a lawsuit will not be necessary
to overcome the redressability problem. For example, if an individual
challenges a federal statute before the state has implemented it, she
has a much stronger argument that invalidating the statute will result
in no state implementing legislation or regulations, thereby averting
any prospective injury to the plaintiff.138 But in many cases, a pre-implementation challenge will be unripe because, until the state chooses
to implement the federal statute, it will not be clear whether the state
will choose to do so or whether the way it implements the statute will
harm the plaintiff.139 Only after the state has implemented the statute
will the challenge be ripe, but by then, the individual plaintiff will face
the redressability problem described above. A rarer, more promising
situation is where a plaintiff’s injury results from a state law that would
be unconstitutional under the state constitution, but for the preemptive force of a commandeering federal law. In that case, invalidation
of the federal law under the Tenth Amendment would permit invalidation of the commandeered state legislation or regulation on state
constitutional grounds.
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982))); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)
(“[T]he effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the [Treasury] funds [is] so
remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for [a taxpayer] appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity.”).
137. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344.
138. It should also be noted that a private party raising a commandeering challenge
could not enjoin a state from implementing the challenged federal legislation or regulation. The anti-commandeering principle forbids only federal compulsion of state legislative
and executive branches—it does not prohibit state officials from voluntarily participating
in a federal regulatory scheme. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185–186
(1992).
139. Cf. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 265–66 (2003) (vacating lower court’s alternative holding on constitutionality of state redistricting plan pursuant to Voting Rights Act in
light of Court’s conclusion that the plan was not properly pre-cleared under the Act); id. at
283 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that ruling on the plan was “premature” (citing
Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam))).
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States could also facilitate individual commandeering challenges
without actually intervening in each suit. For example, where a state
does not wish to bring a commandeering challenge against a federal
statute but has doubts about its constitutionality, it can enact legislation or promulgate regulations providing that legislation or regulations enacted pursuant to the federal statute will become ineffective
or void if that statute is found unconstitutional.140 Such a provision
would remedy the redressability problem, at least in the case where an
individual suffers ongoing injury from a state regulation that was improperly commandeering by federal law, because if the individual succeeds, the commandeered state action will immediately cease. An
even broader approach, suggested by one commentator, is for a state
to enact a qui tam or citizen suit statute that would authorize individuals to bring commandeering or other constitutional challenges on the
state’s behalf.141
Thus, as a practical matter, states will continue to have considerable control over commandeering challenges by private parties, even
after Bond. States can facilitate such challenges by joining individual
suits or making regulatory or legislative action contingent on a federal
statute’s continuing validity. States can also preclude individual commandeering challenges by making clear that they will continue to implement the commandeered state regulations regardless of the federal
statute’s validity. Only where an individual has some independent
grounds for challenging the commandeered state regulatory activity
will the federal court reach the merits of their commandeering challenge. This result makes good policy sense and is consistent with federalism and standing principles. From a federalist perspective, states
have strong institutional incentives to protect their sovereign prerogatives from federal encroachment and there is little danger that all fifty
states will acquiesce in an unconstitutional federal statute that improperly commandeers state officials. States may choose in some cases
to enlist the help of their citizens in policing and enforcing their sovereign rights, but they need not do so. Concerning standing, federal
courts have little reason to clarify the uncertain and controversial line
140. To further facilitate individual challenges, the state might even provide that the
law or regulation should be considered void ab initio if the federal statute is invalidated.
But such a provision could be problematic as it could create considerable undesirable uncertainty about the future validity of official acts pursuant to the state law or regulation.
141. See Gershengorn, supra note 101, at 1088–95. Although Gershengorn presents
compelling arguments for the constitutionality of such a statute, the matter is unsettled,
and the simpler expedients proposed above may be a safer way for states to facilitate individual Tenth Amendment challenges.
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between federal power and states’ rights if it is not necessary to redress
a concrete injury to private parties, and no state believes that the challenged federal statute has impugned its sovereignty.

IV.

The Future of Individual Tenth Amendment Challenges

Individual Tenth Amendment challenges are likely to increase
now that Bond has removed one important standing obstacle for such
challenges. Even before Bond, one of the most common Tenth
Amendment challenges was by individuals convicted under
SORNA.142 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond, several circuit courts had dismissed criminal defendants’ Tenth Amendment
challenges to SORNA.143 Bond makes clear that these defendants satisfy Article III’s injury requirements due to their incarceration and
that the Tenth Amendment imposes no prudential bar to such
claims.144 Accordingly, we anticipate renewed challenges to SORNA
based on the requirements it imposes on states.145
Beginning in 1994, federal law has required states, as a condition
for receipt of certain law enforcement funds, to create systems for sexoffender registration and community notification.146 In 2006, Congress enhanced these provisions by passing SORNA, part of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.147 Although by 1996 every
state had adopted their version of mandatory sex offender registration
laws, SORNA implemented a national sex offender registry with the
142. A Westlaw search reveals over 100 federal cases considering Tenth Amendment
challenges to SORNA.
143. E.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525–27 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2010).
144. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–64 (2011).
145. Significantly, in a case before the Sixth Circuit, the Department of Justice withdrew its argument that a defendant lacked standing to challenge SORNA as violating the
Tenth Amendment. Letter pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 28(j), United States v. Trent, 654
F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 08–4482). The Sixth Circuit ultimately held that the defendant had not been required to register under SORNA and thus did not reach the merits of
his Tenth Amendment challenge to SORNA. United States v. Trent, 654 F.3d 574, 576 &
n.1 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, since Bond, at least two courts of appeals have held in precedential opinions that the Tenth Amendment poses no barrier to individual challenges
against SORNA. United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Smith, 655 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2011).
146. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2238–39 (2010) (discussing the history
of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006), and SORNA).
147. SORNA, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 590, 590–611 (2006) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
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purpose of removing inconsistencies among state registries.148 Specifically, SORNA requires states to create and maintain a state-wide sex
offender registry conforming to the requirements of SORNA, provide
a criminal penalty for a sex offender’s failure to register, input information into the registry, and share this information to other law enforcement agencies.149
In addition to the requirements it imposes on the states, SORNA
imposes two distinct demands on sex offenders. First, it requires sex
offenders “to register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender [resides, works, or studies.]”150 While
SORNA requires states to provide criminal penalties for the sex offender’s failure to comply with this registration requirement, this statute does not include an enforcement provision criminalizing the
failure to register under federal law.151 However, SORNA separately
requires any person who has committed a sex offense—and therefore
is required to register under SORNA—and travels in interstate or foreign commerce to register at their new location.152 This provision, 18
U.S.C. § 2250, makes it a federal criminal offense for anyone to fail to
register after traveling.153 As explained by the Supreme Court: “Once
a person becomes subject to SORNA’s registration requirements, . . .
that person can be convicted under § 2250 if he thereafter travels and
then fails to register.”154
Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider SORNA’s constitutionality, the courts of appeals have uniformly upheld the Act
against a variety of constitutional challenges.155 However, prior to
Bond, many Tenth Amendment challenges to SORNA had been dismissed for lack of standing, relying on the reasoning of the majority of
circuits, as described above. Both the Eighth and the Third Circuits
specifically held that criminal defendants indicted for failing to regis148. United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2011); see 152 CONG. REC. S8013
(daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Laws regarding registration for sex
offenders have not been consistent from State to State[, but] now all States will lock arms
and present a unified front in the battle to protect children.”).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912(a), 16913(e), 16921(b) (2006); see also United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 155–56 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing SORNA).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a).
151. Id. § 16913(a), (e); see Pendleton, 636 F.3d at 83 (noting that § 16913 does not have
an enforcement provision).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
153. Id.
154. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010).
155. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137, 140–41 (5th Cir. 2011) (listing circuit court cases that have upheld SORNA or reversed decisions that have rejected parts of
SORNA as unconstitutional).
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ter as a sex offender under Section 2250 of SORNA lack standing to
challenge the law under the Tenth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit,
in United States v. Hacker, was the first court of appeals to address standing in the SORNA context.156 The court held that a “private party
does not have standing to assert that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment
absent the involvement of a state or instrumentalities.”157 The court
explained that the limitation was related to the prudential bar to
third-party standing.158 The fact that the court entertained the defendant’s challenge to SORNA as exceeding Congress’ authority under
the Commerce Clause further indicates that it viewed the Tenth
Amendment standing bar as prudential. Substantively, the court’s
analysis of the Tenth Amendment bar to individual standing was
based almost entirely on Tennessee Electric.159
In United States v. Shenandoah, the Third Circuit addressed a similar challenge, though Shenandoah’s challenge was framed more explicitly as a commandeering challenge.160 Shenandoah alleged that
“SORNA is unconstitutional because it compels [state] law enforcement to accept registrations from federally-mandated sex offender
programs in violation of the Tenth Amendment . . . .”161 The court
perfunctorily dismissed the claim, concluding that because Shenandoah was challenging SORNA in his individual capacity without arguing that his interests were aligned with the states, he “lack[ed]
standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to SORNA.”162 The
court did not analyze whether the Tenth Amendment protected individual rights, nor did it explain whether this was a prudential or constitutional limitation. Instead, the court merely cited to several similar
circuit courts’ holdings, including Hacker.163
However, prior to Bond, two courts of appeals reached the merits
of SORNA challenges. In Kennedy v. Allera, the Fourth Circuit rejected
a defendant’s Tenth Amendment challenge to his SORNA conviction.164 The court noted that the challenge would “face a serious
standing question” in light of the cases holding that an individual
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

565 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 526–27.
595 F.3d 151, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 161–62.
612 F.3d 261, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2010).
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lacks standing to assert Tenth Amendment claims, but noted that the
defendant had Article III standing to challenge his conviction because
the standing problem was based “only [on] prudential concerns.”165
The court assumed arguendo that it had jurisdiction and rejected the
Tenth Amendment challenge on the merits.166 The court held that
SORNA did not commandeer the State of Maryland in violation of the
Tenth Amendment because it only requires sex offenders to register
with states, but does not “require that the States comply with its
directives.”167
Similarly, in United States v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit reached the
merits of a defendant’s Tenth Amendment challenge to SORNA.168
The court held that defendant’s claim satisfied Article III’s requirements because he had been injured by his incarceration and that relief would be granted if SORNA were declared unconstitutional under
the Tenth Amendment.169 The court recognized that prudential
standing principles might bar the defendant from asserting a defense
based on the Tenth Amendment, but decided to resolve the Tenth
Amendment question in light of the “simplicity of the merits.”170 Following Allera, the court reasoned that because SORNA’s state registration provisions were merely conditions on federal funding, they did
not improperly coerce the states and thus did not violate the Tenth
Amendment.171
However, even though some courts of appeals have reached the
merits of commandeering challenges to SORNA, those courts of appeals that have yet to consider such challenges may be reluctant to do
so, as SORNA’s unique structure poses two important obstacles to
commandeering challenges. First, SORNA’s criminal prohibition is
not clearly tied to those provisions requiring states to implement a sex
offender registry. Several courts of appeals have noted this disconnect
165. Id. at 269–70, 270 n.3.
166. Id. at 270 & n.3.
167. Id. at 269.
168. 632 F.3d 912, 919–20 (5th Cir. 2011).
169. Id. at 919 & nn.29–30 (noting a circuit split on the issue and that Bond was pending before the Supreme Court).
170. Id. at 919–20, 920 n.33 (citing Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 151 (1st Cir.
2006)) (noting that bar on hypothetical exercise of jurisdiction only applies where Article
III standing was implicated).
171. Id. at 920 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987)). As noted,
since Bond, at least two other courts of appeals have held that a criminal defendant does
have standing to challenge SORNA on Tenth Amendment grounds, but both have rejected
the claims on the merits. See United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s commandeering challenge, reasoning that states are free to forego federal funding); United States v. Smith, 655 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).
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and have held that a sex offender’s obligation to register does not
depend on the implementation of SORNA’s uniform registry requirements in the state where the defendant resides.172 In other words, although SORNA imposes uniform requirements on states’ registries,
the offenders’ requirements to register exist whether or not the state
has complied with its obligations. Therefore, even if the state’s requirements were declared unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, the offender would ostensibly still be required under SORNA to
register in that state. This is not necessarily a standing problem. One
might say that a defendant convicted of violating SORNA’s criminal
prohibitions has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition, but not unrelated SORNA provisions, as invalidation of those
provisions would not affect his conviction and thus would not redress
his injury.173 Or one might just as plausibly say that, on the merits,
SORNA’s criminal prohibition does not violate the anti-commandeering rule because the provision does not compel the states to regulate anyone and does not depend for its validity on improperly
compelled state regulation.174 However one characterizes this prob172. United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2010) (“New York and
Pennsylvania may never implement SORNA, choosing, for whatever reason, to forego a
portion of their federal funding. This failure to implement a federal law, however, does
not give sex offenders a reason to disregard their federal obligation to update their state
registrations. When a sex offender travels in interstate commerce and disobeys the federal
command to keep his or her registration current, as required by SORNA, he or she is
subject to prosecution.”); see also Felts, 674 F.3d at 604 (“The duty of an offender to register
is independent of whether or not the state has implemented SORNA.”); United States v.
Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2009) (“That SORNA also requires jurisdictions to
update and improve their registration programs, and that New York and Florida had not
yet met those administrative requirements, does not excuse Hester’s failure to meet the
registration requirements that SORNA imposes on individual sex offenders and to register
with the programs that did exist.”); United States v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir.
2009) (“We agree with our sister circuits that a sex offender is not exempt from SORNA’s
registration requirements merely because the jurisdiction in which he is required to register has not yet implemented SORNA.”); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 463–64 (4th
Cir. 2009) (“SORNA § 113(a)’s requirements to register and maintain registration are not
expressly conditioned on a State’s implementation of the Act . . . .”); United States v.
Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 939 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[SORNA’s Proposed] Guidelines state that,
while SORNA does set ‘minimum standards for jurisdictions’ registration and notification
programs,’ it does not require statutory implementation.” (quoting 72 Fed. Reg. 30,213–14
(May 30, 2007))).
173. The Supreme Court has recognized in other cases that whether a challenged statutory provision is severable from other provisions can affect a challenger’s standing. See
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–32 (1983) (discussing severability of a federal statute for
standing purposes).
174. However, it should be noted that Section 16913(e) of SORNA does require states,
as a condition of funding, to enact their own criminal penalties for sex-offenders who fail
to register. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(e) (2006). Thus, a criminal defendant convicted under a
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lem, it may preclude commandeering challenges by those convicted
of violating SORNA’s criminal registration provision. This also illustrates an important difficulty for most private parties bringing commandeering challenges. Like SORNA, a number of federal laws
susceptible to a commandeering challenge belong to a complex regulatory scheme, only a part of which may involve improperly compelling state regulation.175 Unless the provisions that commandeer state
executive or legislative functions are not severable from the larger
scheme, a private plaintiff bringing a commandeering challenge may
be required to trace her injury to those specific provisions.
Second, even if a court were to conclude that SORNA’s criminal
prohibition on failing to register applies only in those states that had
complied with SORNA’s registration requirements, a criminal defendant challenging his SORNA conviction could still face the redressability problem discussed in the preceding section. Invalidation of
the registration requirements that SORNA imposes on the states
would not render state legislation implementing those requirements
automatically invalid. States are free to comply with federal directives
even if they cannot be compelled to do so.176 To establish redressability, a defendant would have to show that if SORNA’s commandeering requirement were invalidated, the state where he was
required to register would not only repeal its sex offender registration
requirements, but would also retroactively absolve him of his failure to
comply with those requirements.177 Given the prevalence of sex offender registration requirements in most states long before the 2006
federally-induced state registration law may have a stronger argument that the injury is
connected to the federal statutory scheme. Of course, as discussed infra, the sex-offender
would still face redressability problems as the state is free to implement the criminal sanctions of its own volition.
175. For example, the federal statutes challenged in Medeiros v. Vincent, essentially
grafted a federal regulatory role onto a more comprehensive regulatory scheme established by an interstate compact. 431 F.3d 25, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2005).
176. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (noting that Congress may
incentivize states to do that which it cannot compel them to do under the commandeering
doctrine); Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[C]onditioning federal
funding on a State’s implementation of a federal program does not, without more, violate
the Tenth Amendment.”).
177. Even this might not suffice, as SORNA’s criminal provision could still quite plausibly be read as requiring that the defendant register in states that had a sex offender registration system in place at the time he moved to the state, regardless of whether the state
subsequently alters or abolishes the registration requirement. Cf. Gould, 568 F.3d at 468–69
(finding that the defendant had failed to register in several states under state registration
statutes in violation of SORNA); Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 938–39 (finding that the defendant
had violated SORNA registration requirement because even though the state that had not
yet implemented SORNA, he failed to register pursuant to state registration statutes).
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SORNA amendments relating to state sex offender registries, defendants will often have difficulty making such a showing.178
This difficulty illustrates another facet of the redressability problem mentioned above. An individual bringing a commandeering challenge need not only show that the commandeered state legislation or
regulation would be eliminated upon invalidation of the compulsory
federal law, but she must also show that elimination of the state legislation or regulation would actually redress a cognizable injury. This
requirement is easily satisfied where the injury is imminent or ongoing—such as a regulatory prohibition that will limit or continues to
limit the plaintiff’s liberty because invalidation of the law removes the
limitation and thus redresses the injury. But where improperly compelled state laws or regulations have worked an injury that is now complete and is unlikely to recur—for example, imposition of a penalty—
it is far from obvious that this injury will be redressed by eliminating
the state law or regulation. This is especially true because, as mentioned above, states may freely choose to comply with unduly coercive
federal laws, and a successful commandeering challenge—even if it
resulted in the repeal of the commandeered state law—would not ordinarily render that law void ab initio. Rather, commandeered state
legislation and regulation should ordinarily be presumed valid and
effective unless and until it is repealed or becomes ineffective by operation of law.

Conclusion
Bond has removed one important prudential standing obstacle to
individual Tenth Amendment claims but does not give federal courts
carte blanche to resolve the merits of all such challenges. Rather, Article III standing principles will require careful consideration of the
precise connection between the allegedly unconstitutional federal action and the plaintiff’s injury. Specifically, in anti-commandeering
challenges, courts and litigants should consider: (1) the nature of the
plaintiff’s injury: Does it result directly from the federal statute, or is it
the result of compelled state action? Is it a past, completed harm, or
an ongoing or prospective injury?; (2) the nature of the challenged
federal statute: Does it stand alone, or is it inseparable from a broader
federal regulatory scheme that operates directly on individuals?; and
178. For example, many states enacted sex offender registration statutes between 1994
and 1996. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative
Rhetoric, 76 IND. L. J. 315, 315–16 (2001) (mentioning state statutes pre-dating federal
Megan’s law).
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(3) the relationship between the federal law and state regulation: Has
the state already voluntarily complied with the challenged federal statute? Will state law change if the federal law is invalidated? In many
cases, private parties asserting an anti-commandeering complaint
against federal law will only be indirectly injured by the law. Their
injury will be more immediately caused by state legislation or regulations implementing federal law, and thus the private party will have to
show how invalidating federal law will change state law in a way that
redresses her injury. The outcome of this fact-specific inquiry will vary
from case to case, but without the support of a state, the private plaintiff will often lack standing. Bond thus not only rejects a categorical bar
to prudential standing for private Tenth Amendment challenges, but
also mandates a more nuanced Article III standing examination. This
inquiry properly recognizes that while some of these challenges may
reach the merits on their own strength, many will continue to require
the support of the states whose sovereignty the Tenth Amendment
protects.

